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1. INTRODUCTION 
Some recent studies of how the content of intentional mental states is 
individuated in ordinary discourse have sparked much debate. These 
studies are striking because they imply that the contents of a person's 
thoughts are not determined by (do not supervene on) his or her 
phenomenological, functional or physiological states. The contents of a 
person's thoughts, it is claimed, may be affected by features of the 
external environment of which he or she is entirely ignorant. The line of 
argument which is taken to lend support to this conclusion was first 
described by Putnam (1975) and has been developed by Burge in a 
series of papers (1979, 1982a, 1982b). The argumentative strategy is to 
test claims about the determinants of mental content by describing 
thought-experiments in which physically and functionally type-identical 
subjects occupy different environments. It is then argued that our 
practice of thought attribution dictates that such subjects have proposi- 
tional attitudes with different contents, since different belief ascriptions 
are true of them. 1 The topic of this paper is the ingenious thought- 
experiment described by Burge (1979) and the conclusion he draws 
from it. 2 Burge's conclusion is that the linguistic practices of the 
community to which a person belongs partly determine the contents of 
his or her intentional mental states. The thought-experiment held to 
support it can be described as follows. 
Burge invites us to consider an English-speaker -- let us call her 
Jane -- who misuses the word 'arthritis', applying it to rheumatoid 
diseases in the bones as well as in the joints. This, Burge argues, does 
not prevent us from reporting her beliefs using ascriptions in which the 
word 'arthritis' occurs in the content-clause. Suppose that Jane says to 
her doctor, 'I have arthritis in my thigh,' that the doctor replies 'You 
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can't have arthritis in the thigh; arthritis is a disease of the joints,' and 
that Jane accepts that her belief was false. It seems that the natural way 
for us to report the belief she expresses is with 
(1) Jane believes that she has arthritis in her thigh. 
We then consider what belief Jane would have had if she had been a 
member of a different linguistic community in which the word 'arthritis' 
was standardly applied to rheumatoid diseases of the bones as well as 
the joints. The counterfactuat condition differs only in that in it correct 
use of 'arthritis' encompasses Jane's actual misuse; Jane's physical and 
functional constitution remains the same. Let us call Jane in this 
counterfactual condition 'Jane2'. Jane2 also utters the words 'I have 
arthritis in my thigh'; but in so doing, Burge argues, she expresses a 
belief not about arthritis but about the more inclusive group of rheu- 
matic conditions. This being so, we cannot report this belief using (1); 
Jane2 does not believe that she has arthritis in her thigh. Thus Jane 
has at least one belief which Jane2 lacks. Since Jane and Jane2 are 
physically and functionally identical and differ only in the linguistic 
communities to which they belong, the difference in their belief contents 
must be attributed to the difference in their linguistic environments. 
Burge concludes that 'propositional attitudes depend partly for their 
content on social factors independent of the individual asocially and 
non-intentionally construed' (1979, p. 85). 
Burge's conclusion challenges what he calls the 'individualistic pre- 
suppositions' of many traditional views of the mind (1979, p. 94). 
According to such views, the contents of a person's thoughts are 
determined by intrinsic properties of that person -- properties he or 
she has when considered in isolation from the external environment. 
Let us say that thoughts which thus supervene on individual constitu- 
tion have individualistic content, and let us call the individuative 
practice which picks them out individualistic individuation. We may 
then say that Burge takes his thought-experiment to show that our 
everyday practice of propositional attitude ascription involves non- 
individualistic individuation, and that the thoughts we attribute to one 
another do not supervene on individual constitution; they have non- 
individualistic content. 
This conclusion, if warranted, obviously casts doubt on any theory of 
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propositional attitudes which represents them as having individualistic 
content. In particular, it casts doubt on a claim which I shall call the 
Continuity Thesis -- the claim that common sense explanations of 
behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes 
will be vindicated by cognitive psychology, in that cognitive psychology 
will invoke explanatory states with properties substantially similar to 
those of common-sense mental states (cf. Fodor 1987). If we make the 
plausible and widely held assumption that the representational states of 
cognitive psychology are individualistically individuated, in that their 
content does not vary with linguistic environment, it is hard to see how 
the Continuity Thesis can be true. According to Burge, propositional 
attitudes are non-individualistically individuated; so his conclusion, if 
warranted, would show that the psychological states invoked by cogni- 
tive psychology and the intentional states ascribed in common sense 
discourse have different identity conditions. Two people with identical 
psychological states might yet have different propositional attitudes if 
they belonged to different linguistic communities; the prospects for the 
Continuity Thesis seem dim. 
We should note that this is not a conclusion Burge would accept, 
since he holds that the representational states of cognitive psychology, 
like the intentional states of common sense, are individuated with 
respect to the environment. He has argued that Marr's theory of vision 
invokes representational states whose content is dependent on the 
nature of the subject's physical environment (Burge 1986a). But this 
claim, if justified, does not suggest that any part of cognitive psychology 
attributes states which are sensitive to subjects' linguistic environments. 
Nor does the argumentative strategy Burge there employs readily 
generalize to the linguistic case. He relies on the claim that the content 
of a psychological state of type R in an environment E depends on 
which features of E normally cause tokens of R (Burge 1986a, p. 32). 
He concludes from this that changes in environmental features can 
change the contents of representational states. But in the linguistic case, 
the norms of usage which supposedly affect the contents of a subject's 
beliefs are not the causes of those beliefs, so a causal theory of content 
is of no help. In any case, the question I shall be concerned with here is 
whether Burge's thought-experiment should lead someone who does 
believe that cognitive psychology is individualistic to abandon the 
316 S A R A H  P A T T E R S O N  
Continuity Thesis, so I shall assume that cognitive psychology does 
individuate representational states individualistically. The discussion 
may still have a hypothetical interest for those who disagree with this 
assumption. 
Let us look a little more closely at exactly how the thought-experi- 
ment is supposed to challenge the Continuity Thesis. It seems that 
common-sense explanations of behaviour cannot be vindicated by 
science if the states which science and common sense attribute to 
explain behaviour are individuated differently. But this conclusion 
follows from the thought-experiment only if the thought-experiment 
shows that the mental states which we attribute when giving common- 
sense explanations of behaviour are non-individualistically individuated. 
If the thought-experiment is to undermine the Continuity Thesis, it must 
justify the claim that we attribute mental states with non-individualistic 
contents when our attitude ascriptions have an explanatory role. This 
has been generally assumed, but we should ask whether this assumption 
is warranted. We need to look more closely at our practice of attitude 
ascription to discover whether we individuate thoughts in a manner 
which is sensitive to social environment when giving common-sense 
explanations of people's actions. 
The aim of this paper is to argue that belief ascription in common- 
sense discourse is not uniformly non-individualistic, as Burge's conclu- 
sion suggests. (In concentrating on belief ascriptions I follow the usual 
practice of treating belief as the paradigm propositional attitude.) I shall 
present some examples which suggest that when giving common-sense 
explanations of action we do not individuate thoughts with reference to 
agents' linguistic environment in the manner indicated by Burge's 
thought-experiment. The challenge supposedly presented to the Con- 
tinnity Thesis by Burge's thought-experiment is thus removed. I then 
discuss whether the mode of individuation characteristic of our ex- 
planatory practice deserves to be called individualistic, and conclude 
with some remarks on the expressibility of thought contents. 
2. B-INDIVIDUATION 
Before moving to the examples of belief attribution, it will be useful to 
attempt to clarify the manner of ascribing thoughts emphasized by 
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Burge's thought-experiment. That thought-experiment presents a partic- 
ular case in which our attribution of belief contents is influenced by the 
subject's linguistic environment. But how far can this result be general- 
ized? For convenience, I will call the mode of content individuation to 
which Burge draws attention 'B-individuation.' What are the important 
features of B-individuation, and when and why do we B-individuate 
beliefs? 
One of the most salient features of the thought-experiment is the fact 
that opaque belief ascriptions containing 'arthritis' can be truly applied 
to Jane despite her misapprehension of the term's extension? In 
ascribing beliefs to her we employ the words she has uttered with their 
customary meaning; we do not reinterpret them to capture her idio- 
syncratic understanding. She is taken to have a grasp, imperfect though 
it is, of the concept of arthritis. Burge acknowledges that there are some 
circumstances in which we do not accord a subject's words their cus- 
tomary interpretation; the cases he mentions include those in which the 
speaker is a child, a foreigner, a speaker of a dialect, or the victim of a 
slip of the tongue. Here the subject either does not yet have full 
command of our standards of usage (the child or foreigner), is not 
bound by them (the dialect speaker), or has full command but fails to 
manifest it because of a performance error (the case of the slip of the 
tongue). In each case the subject is excused from being taken at his or 
her word; it is assumed that the speakers did not say what they meant, 
or did not mean what they said (except the case of the dialect speaker, 
who did not say what we thought he or she said). In the case of Jane, by 
contrast, we accord her words their customary interpretation, despite 
her misunderstanding, because she accepts that she said and believed 
something false. The critical point for the thought-experiment is thus 
not (as Burge sometimes suggests) that Jane is prepared to defer to 
communal usage by altering her use of 'arthritis'; the foreigner will do 
that too, yet we do not take his words literally in ascribing him beliefs. 
The crucial point is that she is prepared to have her words construed 
according to their socially established meaning, even though this puts 
her in the wrong. 
This partial list of cases in which we take subjects at their word in 
attributing beliefs shows that there is still much that is unclear about 
our practice of B-individuation. How, for example, do we decide when 
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someone is a member of our linguistic community? If Jane were 
prepared to alter her linguistic usage (for, say, purely pragmatic reasons), 
but not to admit that her belief was false, should we still ascribe to her 
the belief that she has arthritis in her thigh? If we were attempting a 
thorough investigation of B-individuation, we would need to discover 
how radical a subject's misunderstanding must be for B-individuation to 
become inappropriate, how linguistic communities are differentiated 
and what the conditions, for membership of them are, and so on. But 
our aim here is merely to get a rough grasp of what B-individuation 
consists in, and of when and why we do it, which will allow us to 
determine whether this is the mode of belief individuation we employ 
when giving common-sense explanations of actions. It seems that 
B-individuation consists in taking subjects to have the attitudes ex- 
pressed by their utterances, when these are interpreted according to the 
standard usage of the linguistic community to which the subject belongs. 
And though it is unclear precisely what determines membership in a 
linguistic community, the type of considerations which are relevant 
indicate something about what our purposes are in B-individuating. 
When we B-individuate we hold people responsible for the opinions 
their utterances express, even though they may not fully understand the 
meanings of the words they utter. The difficulty raised earlier is that it 
is not yet clear whether we hold people thus responsible even when 
they themselves maintain that this involves a misconstrual of their 
claims. Presumably our practice in such cases often depends on whether 
we see the speaker's response as a disingenuous attempt to avoid 
criticism, or as a claim made in good faith. But the fact that this is the 
sort of consideration which guides us suggests that our interest in 
B-individuating is primarily in intellectual responsibility; our purpose is 
to determine which beliefs a speaker is committed to defending in 
debate. If our interests in B-individuating have this specific focus, it 
would not be so surprising to find that we individuate mental states 
differently when our purpose is to explain a person's actions. 
The sections which follow present some cases which illustrate how 
we individuate beliefs when giving common-sense psychological ex- 
planations of action. I argued in the previous section that the alternative 
mode of individuation here illustrated, which I shall call E-individuation, 
is the one which should command our attention if we are interested 
E X P L A N A T O R Y  R O L E  OF B E L I E F  A S C R I P T I O N S  319 
in comparing the individuation of explanatory states in cognitive psy- 
chology and common-sense discourse. The examples show that when 
we give common-sense explanations we may attribute mental states 
which differ from those counselled by B-individuation. I shall begin 
with a case in which we B-individuate one belief but E-individuate two. 
3. S O M E  C A S E S  OF I N C O M P L E T E  U N D E R S T A N D I N G  
3.1. The Case of Paul 
The first case is an elaboration of thought-experiment decribed by Loar 
(1988). Suppose that Paul is an English speaker who is misinformed 
about arthritis in just the same way as Jane; and let us suppose that he 
says, 'Arthritis is spreading from my knees to my thigh.' Given this 
utterance, the principles of B-individuation dictate that we should 
describe him as believing that he has arthritis in his knees and in his 
thigh. He moves to France and learns French, hearing of an ailment 
called 'arthrite' which, he learns, occurs only in joints. No one tells him 
that 'arthrite' and 'arthritis' refer to the same disease, and not surprisingly 
(in view of his original misconception), this is not one of his beliefs. 
Then a French doctor tells him (in French) that he has arthritis in his 
knees, and he believes her; he asserts 'J'ai arthrite aux genoux.' Paul is a 
competent French speaker who use 'arthrite' correctly, so the obvious 
way for us to report the belief he thus asserts is with 
(2) Paul believes that he has arthritis in his knees. 
As the principles of B-individuation dictate, we report the belief Paul 
asserted, interpreting his words according to their standard meaning. 
The ascription (2) is thus counselled twice by the practice of 
B-individuation; we apply it on the basis of Paul's French assertion and 
on the basis of his English one. But suppose that a French friend tells 
Paul of a miracle heat treatment for arthritis, and that Paul applies the 
treatment to his knees and believes it has succeeded. He will continue 
to search for a cure for the other disease he believes afflicts his knees 
and thigh; if asked whether there is anything wrong with his knees, he 
will still say that there is. How are we to explain this behaviour? It 
seems to be intelligible only on the assumption that he has two different 
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beliefs about what is wrong with his knees, even though the B-ascription 
(2) fails to distinguish them. If we B-individuate beliefs, we do not have 
the resources to explain Paul's behaviour; but surely we can understand 
perfectly well why he behaves as he does. 
On its most plausible interpretation, the story of Paul shows that in 
giving common-sense explanations of others' actions we may need to 
individuate beliefs more finely than we do when B-individuating. In 
explaining Paul's behaviour we invoke two beliefs differing in content, 
even though B-individuation delivers only one ascription to describe his 
mental situation. How might a theorist who regards B-individuation as 
adequate for common-sense psychological explanation -- a person I 
shall describe as a Burgean -- respond to this example? 
3.2. Burgean Responses Considered 
3.2.1. First response. A Burgean might simply deny that the B-ascription 
is inadequate to explain Paul's behaviour. But this is very implausible; it 
means that Paul's failure to act as we would expect given the belief 
ascribed to him by (2) can only be explained by irrationality or 
carelessness. We would have to say, for example, that he continues to 
seek a cure for arthritis because he has forgotten that he applied the 
French treatment. Intuitively this is not the cause of his behaviour, and 
this move locates his problem in entirely the wrong place. His failure to 
act as expected is due rather to lack of information; he does not know 
that the disease called 'arthritis' and the disease called 'arthrite' are one 
and the same. As a result, he does not draw the apparently obvious 
conclusion that there is only one thing wrong with his knees. 
3.2.2. Second response. The reply to the preceding objection suggests a 
different response. The idea would be to maintain that Paul has just one 
belief about what is wrong with his knees, as reported by (2), and to 
attribute his unusual behaviour to his failure to recognize that the 
words 'arthrite' and 'arthritis' have the same meaning. Paul is ignorant 
of this metalinguistic truth; but can this fact in conjunction with the 
B-ascription (2) suffice to explain his actions? We are assuming he acts 
as follows: he applies the French cure for arthritis to his knees, and 
believes that it has succeeded, yet still continues to search for a cure for 
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the ailment he believes affects his knees and thigh. This train of events 
would most naturally be explained by saying that Paul begins by 
believing that he has two ailments in his knees, comes to believe that 
one has been cured, and desires to find a cure for the one he believes 
still remains. According to this account, his initial and final mental 
states differ. According to the metalinguistic Burgean response, how- 
ever, Paul's assertions at the beginning and end of the story support a 
single B-ascription. How can Paul's metalinguistic ignorance be used to 
remedy this? 
The Burgean's most promising move appears to be to claim that 
although Paul has a single belief, its content being that he has arthritis 
in his knees, his metalinguistic ignorance leads him to think that he has 
two beliefs which differ in content. So he starts out thinking he has two 
beliefs and ends up thinking he has one. This accommodates our 
intuition that Paul's final and initial mental state are different; but does 
it explain why he acts as he does? To explain this the Burgean will have 
to say something along these lines: that Paul thinks he has a belief he 
formulates as 'I have arthritis in my knees,' he thinks he has a belief he 
formulates as 'J'ai arthfite anx genoux,' he thinks the two beliefs are 
different, and he thinks the application of the cure gives him reason to 
give up one but not the other. 
But the Burgean who takes this line is effectively conceding that the 
B-ascription (2) is inadequate to account for Paul's behaviour, and is 
making all the distinctions among mental states that we are claiming are 
required for psychological explanation. The difference between the 
taxonomy of belief contents offered by B-individuation and the tax- 
onomy required for explaining actions is being recognized; the distinc- 
tions required for explanation are simply being made at the level of 
second-order beliefs. But the claim that Paul is acting out of beliefs 
about what he believes is very implausible. There is no independent 
reason to suppose that the beliefs Paul acts on are beliefs about what 
his beliefs are, rather than ordinary object-level beliefs: In other words, 
the proposal is ad hoc. 
3.2.3. Third response. A Burgean could deny that we would B-individ- 
uate beliefs as I have described, denying in particular that we would 
report the belief Paul expresses in French using (2). But given the 
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principles of B-individuation described above this seems implausible. A 
competent French speaker who says 'J'ai arthrite aux genoux' surely 
expresses the belief that he or she has arthritis in the knees, and Paul is 
a competent French speaker who use the word 'arthrite' perfectly, It 
would be more plausible to claim that (2) is not a correct report of the 
belief Paul acquired in England, in view of his misunderstanding of the 
English word. But to claim this is to abandon the fundamental principle 
of B-individuation -- the principle that speakers' words are to be 
interpreted according to their standard use, and not according to how 
they understand them, when giving belief reports. 
3.3. Conclusions from the Case of Paul 
The implausibility of these attempts to reinterpret the example of Paul 
shows that we have here a strong case for the claim that E-individuation 
- -  the individuation of thoughts required by common-sense psychologi- 
cal explanation -- sometimes compels us to discriminate belief contents 
more finely than does B-individuation. In the next section I shall argue 
that the converse is also true; that is, that the demands of psychological 
explanation sometimes lead us to discriminate belief contents more 
coarsely than they are picked out by B-individuation. 
3.4. The Case of Alfred 
The example I shall use is one employed by Burge in an earlier paper in 
which he himself draws attention to two sets of intuitions about how 
beliefs should be individuated. Burge (1978) introduces Alfred, who 
misunderstands the word 'fortnight', applying it to periods of ten rather 
than fourteen days. Alfred also believes that Bertrand will be gone for 
ten days; we may suppose that Bertrand has told him this, and that 
Alfred believes him. Alfred now utters the words, 'Bertrand will be 
gone for a fortnight.' It is plausible that Alfred thereby asserts that 
Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight; he is a generally competent 
speaker of English bound by its conventions. But does he believe that 
Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight? 
The principles of B-individuation would of course dictate that Alfred 
E X P L A N A T O R Y  ROLE OF BELIEF  ASCRIPTIONS 323 
does believe this, since this is what he asserted. Indeed, Burge reports 
that many people, desiring 'to maintain a close relation between sincere 
assertion and belief' (1978 p. 132), hold that the following is true: 
(3) Alfred believes that Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight. 
These informants were evidently attributing beliefs according to the 
principles of B-individuafion. However, Burge also notes that there is a 
widespread intuition that Alfred does n o t  believe that Bertrand will be 
gone for a fortnight, despite the fact that this is what he asserted. 
Holders of this view maintain that Alfred holds only the belief given by 
(4) Alfred believes that Bertrand will be gone for ten days 
and not that given by (3). The attractions of this view are obvious if we 
are interested in explaining Alfred's actions. Let us suppose that Alfred 
has to meet Bertrand's train; we have no hesitation in predicting that he 
will go to the station in ten rather than fourteen days' time, his reason 
being that he believes that Bertrand will return in ten days. By contrast, 
describing Alfred as believing that Bertrand will return in a fortnight 
does nothing to explain why he goes to the station after ten days have 
elapsed. As Burge remarks, 'defenders of this v i e w . . ,  tend to mention 
the fact that Alfred had in mind a period of ten days . . . .  Alfred's 
actions will largely be based on his belief that Bertrand will be gone for 
ten days. His linguistic mistake is irrelevant for such purposes as 
meeting the train' (1978 p. 133). Holders of this view were evidently 
E-individuating, attributing beliefs with any eye to common-sense 
psychological explanation. 
As before we must deal with objections from the Burgean, who in 
this case will want to deny that the demands of common-sense psy- 
chological explanation lead to the rejection of (3). But if the Burgean 
adheres to Burge's procedure, which is to attempt to accommodate as 
much as possible of our ordinary practice, the intuitions of the many 
speakers who withhold (3) because of its irrelevance to explaining 
Alfred's actions must be respected. However, the Burgean may attempt 
to argue that the practice of these speakers is inconsistent. The strategy 
here would be to take advantage of Burge's claim that both those who 
affirm and those who reject (3) agree to 
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(5) Alfred believes that a fortnight is ten days. 
If proponents of E-individuation accept (4) and (5), it seems that they 
can hardly deny (3); for if Alfred believes that Bertrand will be gone for 
ten days, and that a fortnight is ten days, he is likely to conclude that 
Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight. Indeed, it seems that we will want 
to hypothesize just such a train of reasoning to explain why Alfred says, 
'Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight.' Consistency thus forces pro- 
ponents of E-individuation to accept (3) if they affirm (5). 
The weak point in this argument is the premise that proponents of 
E-individuation are committed to accepting (5). It is true that one might 
well explain Alfred's utterance by saying, 'He believes that a fortnight 
is ten days'; but we are equally likely to say something like, 'He says 
"fortnight" when he means ten days.' In everyday discourse people are 
generally lax about the distinction between using and mentioning a 
word, so it is not surprising that they should be indifferent between 
those formulations which portray Alfred's mistake at the object level (as 
does (5)) and those which portray it as metalinguistic. Given the laxity 
of everyday speech, it does not seem that there is any great obstacle to 
regarding (5) as a loose rendering of 
(6) Alfred believes that 'fortnight' means ten days. 
This analysis affords us a way of accommodating a curious feature of 
E-individuative practice which is revealed by Alfred's case. Burge notes 
that 'on the negative [i.e. E-individuative] view, we withhold attribution 
of belief with terms . . .  misunderstood by the believer, except in 
attributions like [(5)] which are the natural means of identifying his 
mistake' (1978 p. 134). On the present account, the attribution in 
question should be interpreted as crediting the speaker with a belief 
about a word (i.e. (6)), not with the concept the word expresses. 
Alfred's utterance is easily explained by citing (4) and (6); since Alfred 
believes that Bertrand will be gone for ten days, and that 'fortnight' 
means ten days, he will think that one way to convey his belief is to say, 
'Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight.' 
Here, though, the Burgean might complain that our metalinguistic 
rendering of (5) is 'an ad hoc piece of special pleading, undermined by 
the evidence we actually use for deciding whether a thought was meta- 
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linguistic' (Burge 1979 p. 97). The claim here is that when presented 
with our account, involving (4) and (6), of the reasoning leading to his 
utterance, Alfred may protest that his reasoning 'did not fix upon 
words' (ibid.). But given that on any reasonable common-sense theory, 
metalinguistic beliefs must surely be implicated in the production of 
utterances, whether we are aware of them or not, we have an indepen- 
dent reason not to view Alfred's response as decisive in this case. 
The conclusion we have reached, then, is that a consistent explanation 
of Alfred's verbal and nonverbal actions can be given if we hold (4) and 
(6) rather than (3) and (5). Furthermore, this is the preferred method of 
attributing beliefs to Alfred to explain his actions; so the claim that one 
can also give a consistent explanation involving (3) and (5) is, though 
true, not really relevant. The question is how people do individuate 
attitudes when giving psychological explanations, not how they might 
consistently do so. The case of Alfred indicates that when explaining 
actions (i.e. when E-individuating), we may prefer belief ascriptions 
which capture subjects' idiosyncratic conceptions to ascriptions which 
credit subjects with the concepts standardly expressed by their words. 
But we have yet to show that E-individuation may be coarser than 
B-individuation; for that we need a case in which we B-individuate two 
beliefs but E-individuate one. 
3.4.1. A thought-experiment. Let us imagine a counterfactual case in 
which Alfred remains exactly as before, insofar as he is nonintentionally 
described, but where he is a member of a linguistic community in which 
the word-form 'fortnight' is standardly used to refer to a period of ten 
days. In other words, the counterfactual condition differs only in that in 
it correct use is the same as Alfred's actual misuse. Let us call Alfred in 
this condition 'Alfred2'. Alfred2, like Alfred, is told that Bertrand will 
be gone ten days, utters the word-forms 'Bertrand will be gone for a 
fortnight,' and goes to the station after ten days have elapsed. We may 
agree with Burge that Alfred2 did not assert that Bertrand would be 
gone for a fortnight; since he belongs to a different linguistic community, 
we cannot interpret his words according to the meanings they would 
have in our dialect. But let us concentrate on Alffed2's action of going 
to the station. What is his reason for doing this? The most natural way 
for us to explain his action, it seems, is to say that he wants to meet 
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Bertrand and believes that he can do so by going to the station after ten 
days have passed; that is, Alfred2 believes Bertrand will gone for ten 
days. Thus we give the same explanation for the actions of Alfred and 
Alfred2 despite the difference in their linguistic environments. If we 
were B-individuating, however, we would ascribe Alfred the belief that 
Bertrand would be gone for a fortnight but withhold that ascription 
from Alfred2. 
In the case of Alfred2, attribution of belief by content expressed --  
B-individuation --  will lead us to withhold the ascription 'Alfred2 
believes that Bertrand will be gone for a formight' and will permit 
'Alfred2 believes that Bertrand will be gone for ten days.' So in this 
case, B-individuation and E-individuation wili counsel the same belief 
attributions. But this does not cast doubt on the reality of E-individua- 
tion as a distinctive practice. There are other cases, as we have seen, 
where the two individuative schemes yield different ascriptions; and 
furthermore, we can see why the two schemes, elsewhere divergent, 
would coincide in the case of Alfred2. They coincide because his usage 
of the word 'fortnight' matches its standard usage in his linguistic 
community. In fact, B-individuation and E-individuation will diverge 
only when agents' unexpected behaviour reveals that their grasp of 
standard usage is imperfect, forcing us to differentiate between the 
actual meanings of the words they use and the meanings they attach to 
them. In the majority of cases, presumably, agents' use of terms is close 
enough to standard use for B- and E-ascriptions to coincide. 
4. E-INDIVIDUATION AND EXPRESSIBILTY 
It is one thing to suggest (as do the cases discussed above) that when 
we are giving common-sense explanations of actions, we may not 
individuate beliefs according to the non-individualistic scheme we have 
been calling B-individuation; it is another to show that the individuative 
scheme we do employ when giving explanations can properly be called 
'individualistic'. But the discussion of these cases gives reason to believe 
that E-individuation can be so described. When we E-individuate belief 
contents we are concerned not with the standard use of the words the 
subject utters, but with the way the subject uses them; we want to know 
the meaning the individual attaches to them, not the meaning the 
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community gives them. Thus the same E-ascriptions can be true of 
individuals who use a symbol in the same way, even though they belong 
to linguistic communities in which that symbol is used differently (e.g. 
Alfred and Alfred2); and where a subject uses two symbols differently, 
two beliefs will be E-individuated even though the symbols in question 
may be used in the same way in two linguistic communities to which the 
subject belongs (e.g. Paul). It is the way the individual uses a symbol, 
not  the way the community uses it, that is importam for E-individuation. 4 
Beliefs thus individuated depend on features of the individual, rather 
than depending on norms in the communities to which individuals 
belong. 
When we E-individuate thoughts, we may withhold that-clauses 
containing words the subject uses or understands in a nonstandard way, 
and instead employ terms, the standard meaning of which captures the 
meaning the subject attaches to the misunderstood word. Thus we use 
"ten days' but not 'fortnight' in describing Alfred's beliefs individualis- 
tically. It follows that individualistic content is at least sometimes 
expressible; that is, that we can at least sometimes pick out individ- 
ualistic beliefs by producing opaque ascriptions which directly display 
their content, as we do in the case of Alfred and Alfred2. In the  case of 
Paul this is not so easy, as there is no readily available expression in 
English which captures the notion Paul first acquires (the notion of a 
rheumatoid disease of the bones and joints). But we can construct a 
case which is parallel to Paul's in that we E-individuate two beliefs and 
B-individuate one, but differs in that the contents of the two E-beliefs 
are expressible. 
Let us suppose that Mary is an English speaker who mislearns the 
word 'fortnight' in America, applying it to periods of ten days. She then 
moves to France and learns French, acquiring the word 'quinzaine' 
which she correctly applies to fortnights. In America she read in an 
encyclopedia the sentence 'The period of the third moon of Saturn is a 
fortnight,' and believed it; now she reads in a French encyclopedia that 
the period of the same moon is "une quinzaine". She is puzzled and 
wonders which book is right. How are we to explain this sequence of 
events? It seems obvious that Mary entertains two thoughts about the 
pe r iod  of this moon; she entertains the thought that it lasts a fortnight 
and the thought that it lasts ten days. She knows that these thoughts 
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cannot both be true, since they differ in content; so she wants to find 
out which is correct. Thus we E-individuate two attitudes: 
(7) Mary wonders whether the period of the third moon of 
Saturn is ten days, 
and 
(8) Mary wonders whether the period of the third moon of 
Saturn is a fortnight. 
By contrast, the principles of B-individuation would lead us to 
attribute only thoughts about fortnights to Mary. The two sentences 
Mary reads have the same socially established meaning; both sentences 
state that the period of the third moon of Saturn is a fortnight, and 
neither concerns periods of ten days. A competent French speaker who 
reads and speculates on the truth of the statement in the French 
encyclopedia would naturally be described as wondering whether the 
period in question is a fortnight; and when we are B-individuating 
Mary's beliefs, we use ascriptions with 'fortnight' in the content clause 
despite her misunderstanding of the word. But (8) alone does not 
provide a satisfactory explanation of Mary's puzzlement; if she acquired 
the same thought from each encyclopedia, why does she wonder which 
one is right? 
The case of Mary differs from that of Paul in that there is a readily 
available expression (namely, 'ten days') which captures Mary's idio- 
syncratic understanding of the word she misuses, while there is no such 
readily available expression to characterize Paul's misconception. But 
what does 'readily available' mean here? It is extremely unlikely that a 
rational, competent speaker of English (as we are imagining Mary to 
be) would not be familiar with the words 'ten' and 'days'; and it is 
equally unlikely, given the frequency with which they are used, that she 
would misapply or misunderstand them. Our willingness to use 'ten 
days' in the content-clause of an E-ascription surely owes much to the 
fact that the expression is almost certainly one she uses, and one she 
uses correctly. Moreover, we have good reason to believe that it 
accurately captures the notion Mary has in mind, since she applies the 
word 'fortnight' exclusively to periods of ten days. By contrast, it is 
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quite possible that Paul would not be familiar with the expressions 
which are candidates for capturing his misconception; he may not 
know, for instance, what 'rheumatoid condition' means. We are also less 
confident, in his case, that our candidate expressions accurately capture 
his concept. 
What does the comparison of the cases of Mary and Paul tell us 
about the constraints on the expressibility of E-individuated or individ- 
ualistic content? It is important to note that the cases illuminate only a 
restricted aspect of our practice; in each case we are concerned with the 
expressibility of E-beliefs in English, and part of the evidence (in 
addition to nonverbal behaviour) for the attributions comes from 
English sentences read or uttered by the subject. The cases can thus 
only tell us about the expressibility in a language L of beliefs acquired 
from statements in L or attributed (at least partly) on the basis of 
utterances in L. The constraint appears to be that an E-individuated 
content is expressible in L under these conditions just in case the 
expressions of L used in the content clause of the E-ascription capture 
the subject's concept and are likely to be used and understood by the 
subject. 
This rule is rough and imprecise, but if it provides at least a partial 
description of our ascriptive practice, it shows that there are limits to 
the expressibility of individualistic thought contents. But the fact that 
we can sometimes express the contents of such thoughts shows that it is 
not in principle impossible to capture a person's individualistic notions, 
even though it may on occasion be difficult to determine which of 
several related notions a person employs, or to know which expressions 
are available (in the sense discussed above) for characterizing them. 
The point to be stressed is that the contents of individualistically 
individuated thoughts do not seem to be essentially inexpressible, as 
some have maintained. Whether or not they are expressible depends on 
external facts such as the expressive resources of the ascriber's language 
and the likelihood of finding a paraphrase couched in terms with which 
the subject will be familiar. Since the expressibility of individualistic 
contents does depend on extraneous considerations, the fact that some- 
times the contents of subjects' individualistically individuated thoughts 
are inexpressible is surely not good evidence for denying that they have 
such thoughts. 
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5. EXPLANATORY STATES IN COMMON-SENSE AND 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
Let us sum up the conclusions argued for so far. I would argue that the 
case of Paul, Alfred and Mary support four claims. These are the 
following: 
(a) when we are giving common-sense psychological explanations in 
terms of mental states with propositional contents, our individuative 
practice may differ from the non-individualistic practice exemplified by 
Burge's thought-experiment; 
(b) the mode of content individuation we there employ can be called 
individualistic, in that it depends not on communally established use of 
words but on individual use; 
(c) where individual and communally accepted use coincide, the two 
modes of individuation pick out the same thoughts; 
(d) the contents of individualistically individuated thoughts are 
sometimes expressible. 
The question we must now ask is: what are the implications of these 
results for the issues raised in the Introduction? Recall that one of the 
motivations for investigating content individuation in common sense 
was to assess the status of the Continuity Thesis. This is the view that 
the explanatory states invoked by cognitive psychology share important 
properties of the attitudes attributed in explanations in common sense. 
Burge's claim that the contents of propositional attitudes are individ- 
uated with reference to linguistic environment, taken together with the 
widespread view that the explanatory states of cognitive psychology are 
not individuated in this way, appeared to cast doubt on the Thesis. But 
it is the individuation of explanatory states in common sense that is 
relevant to the truth of the Thesis, and the examples discussed in this 
paper indicate that Burge's thought-experiment is not representative of 
how we attribute thoughts when giving common-sense psychological 
explanations. The challenge supposedly presented to the Continuity 
Thesis by the thought-experiment is thus rebuffed (though the Thesis 
may of course remain questionable on other grounds). The picture we 
glean from the examples is that our common-sense practice of attitude 
ascription is complex; we individuate thoughts in one way when ex- 
plaining others' actions, in another when identifying the opinions they 
E X P L A N A T O R Y  R O L E  O F  B E L I E F  A S C R I P T I O N S  331 
are committed to defending. In the context of explanation we attempt to 
capture as closely as possible the meanings individuals attach to their 
words, even though this may be difficult to express; in the context of 
debate, we hold them to the socially accepted meaning of their words, 
even though they themselves may not fully understand the words they 
use .  5 
N O T E S  
1 The content of a mental state or event is given by the that-clause of the ascription 
used to attribute the state or event to a thinker. For our purposes we may follow Burge 
in remaining neutral as to precisely what contents are: our interest is in patterns of 
propositional attitude ascription. 
2 My reason for focussing on Burge's thought-experiment is that the implications he 
draws from it are so wide-ranging. The usual interpretation of Putnam's thought-experi- 
ment is that it shows that the content of thoughts about natural kinds is partly deter- 
mined by which natural kinds occur in the subject's physical environment. The impact 
of the linguistic environment appears to be much more extensive. Burge claims that the 
contents of thoughts about artefacts, natural kinds, colours, abstract entities, actions, 
and physical movements are all affected by linguistic environment (1979 p. 79). 
3 Strictly speaking, it is not the belief ascription which is opaque or transparent but the 
belief construction as it appears in a particular context. For convenience, I ~ call a 
belief ascription 'opaque' when terms in the that-clause are not open to substitution by 
co-referential expressions salva veritate. 
4 I should stress that these remarks are not intended to imply that meaning reduces to 
use, or that use is responsible for meaning. The claim is that the cases discussed earlier 
indicate that when individuating beliefs with an eye to action explanation, we treat 
subjects' use of words as important indicators of the content of their beliefs. It is one 
thing to say that use provides evidence for content, another to say that use determines 
content. 
5 I am grateful to Ned Block, Ann Bumpus, Joshua Cohen, Jim Higginbotham, and 
Stephen White for helpful comments on various versions of this paper. Versions of it 
were presented to audiences at M.I.T., the University of Michigan, SUNY at Stony 
Brook, North Carolina State University, the College of the Holy Cross, and the Uni- 
versity of New Hampshire. I would like to thank the members of these audiences for 
their comments. 
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